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WATER LAW REVIEW
Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding pesticides
discharged into navigable waters in compliance with FIFRA that leave
no excess material after fulfilling their intended purpose, are not "pol-
lutants" requiring an NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act).
Jeff Hagener, director of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks ("Department"), initiated a ten-year program to reintroduce
a threatened species of fish, the westslope cutthroat trout, into Cherry
Creek. Competition from a non-native trout species threatened the
westslope cutthroat trout's survival. The program included a plan to
remove the non-native trout. This removal involved applying the pesti-
cide amtimycin into the water for short durations over a period of sev-
eral years before the westslope cutthroat trout reintroduction.
Cherry Lake, Cherry Creek, and all of its tributaries are navigable
waters subject to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Department ap-
plied antimycin in accordance with the requirements of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), but did not
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit pursuant to the CWA. The antimycin discharge served the pro-
ject's purpose by eradicating the non-native trout species as planned.
William Fairhurst brought suit against Hagener under the citizen
suit provision in the CWA. Fairhurst alleged that Hagener violated the
Clean Water Act when the Department applied antimycin without an
NPDES permit. Fairhurst sought an injunction prohibiting any future
antimycin application without an NPDES permit. The District Court
for the District of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of
Hagener. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a pesticide applied directly and
intentionally to navigable waters is a "pollutant" for purposes of the
CWA, when such administration was performed in accordance with an
EPA-approved FIFRA label, and when the pesticide performed as in-
tended.
The court examined the meaning of "chemical waste" for purposes
of the CWA. The court found the plain meaning of "waste" referred to
damaged, defective, or superfluous material produced by a manufac-
turing process. The court applied this definition to the Department's
antimycin use and determined that the antimycin was not a "chemical
waste" because the Department applied it and it functioned as in-
tended, leaving no residual excess portions after performing its in-
tended use. Moreover, the court cited and afforded deference to an
EPA Interpretative Statement from February 2005 that concluded pes-
ticides that are administered in conformance with FIFRA are not
"chemical wastes."
The Ninth Circuit held that when pesticides are (1) intentionally
applied for a beneficial purpose in compliance with FIFRA, (2) pro-
duce no unintended effects, and (3) leave no excess material, they are
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not "chemical wastes," and thus are not "pollutants" requiring an
NPDES permit. The court held that Hagener was not in violation of
the CWA because the antimycin discharge did not require an NPDES
permit. However, the Ninth Circuit did express that registration and
labeling under FIFRA does not necessarily preclude the NPDES permit
requirement under the CWA.
Michael Graetz
Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding the conservation district's master federal contract and
the irrigation districts' subcontracts precluded landowners' enforce-
ment of contractual terms as third-party beneficiaries).
Landowners within the Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation and Drainage
District and the Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District ("irri-
gation districts") brought an action for declaratory relief against the
Central Arizona Water Conservation District ("Conservation District")
as third-party beneficiaries to contracts between the Conservation Dis-
trict and the federal government ("master contract") and the irrigation
districts ("subcontracts"), for operation and water delivery under the
Colorado Basin River Project Act. The landowners sought to prevent
the Conservation District from negotiating new contractual terms to
alter the amount of water the irrigation districts, and therefore land-
owners, received each year. The landowners claimed the Conservation
District had obligations, based on vested water rights under both the
master and subcontracts, to deliver project water to the irrigation dis-
tricts for the benefit of the landowners.
The Conservation District removed the case to federal court. The
federal district court dismissed the action on summary judgment be-
cause the landowners were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiar-
ies of the master contract or subcontracts, and they were therefore un-
able to enforce contractual terms. The landowners appealed.
The ninth circuit upheld the district court. After review of the
master and subcontracts' language, the appellate court determined
that neither contract manifested intent to create third-party beneficiary
status for the landowners regarding vested water rights from the irriga-
tion districts. The court reasoned that because the master contract
and the subcontracts did not clearly intend to allow third-party benefi-
ciary status to all groups potentially benefited, the contracts did not
confer vested rights to agricultural priority water. Consequently, the
landowners were merely incidental beneficiaries to the subcontracts
without a vested fight to the irrigation districts' water. The appellate
court upheld the district court's dismissal on summary judgment.
Amy Mockenhaupt
Issue I
